Truth is casualty in fog of the Afghan war

The Times
May 08, 2002
by Bronwen Maddox

The frustration of Operation Snipe this week replicates many of the frustrations of the Afghan campaign, not least the lack of information.

The disconcerted disappointment of British and American forces at finding no al-Qaeda presence in the valleys they are penetrating has been accurately communicated to the outside world, no doubt. But claims that the operation is successful all the same are less convincing.

It is another example of the extraordinary poverty of information in this war, most acutely for the public and the media although often for the military themselves.

From the start of the war, there has been grumbling in the US media that this is the "unwitnessed war". They have a point: the Pentagon has not gone out of its way to help.

Those in charge of the American military, after all, had their formative experience during Vietnam. Many of that military generation are convinced, in the now trite saying, that the Vietnam War was lost on the six-o'clock news. In other US military conflicts since then - such as Somalia, Grenada, Panama - information has been minimal.

Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, has often said he considers the military has little to gain by releasing much about operations. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the US media was reluctant to press the Pentagon too aggressively, for fear of losing public support.

On the other hand, it is clear that some of the fog of the Afghan war extends to the battleground itself. In a region where Americans are considered the enemy by many, even by the Taleban's opponents, the US has clearly lacked information on the ground.

In early December Rumsfeld called the Taleban "world class liars", denying charges from the region that the Pentagon was suppressing figures about civilian deaths. At the same time, he gave an impassioned account of how difficult it was to get reliable reports from the ground.

At this stalled and incomplete stage of the war, it is worth taking stock of how the most controversial claims throughout the campaign now look. Often, it appears that the Bush Administration has tried to deny the errors and accidents on the ground, sometimes deliberately, other times because, as it now appears, it did not know the truth.

First raid on Kandahar, October 19: The first attempt to put US forces on the ground. Delta Force struck at Mullah Omar's house in Kandahar, and US Rangers at a nearby airfield.

General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the troops met "light resistance", called the mission "successful", said "we accomplished our objectives", and that forces took Taleban files.

Then a row broke out over a New Yorker story, by the respected investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, that a dozen Delta Forces commandos were hurt, three seriously, as they came under unexpectedly heavy enemy fire.

The Pentagon first attacked Hersh's account, then acknowledged there had been injuries, but from hitting rocks while parachuting, not enemy inflicted. According to Rumsfeld: "There were some explosives used to break into places, as a result of which some pieces of materials, concrete, fragmented and there were five people who had fragmentation wounds of various types."

According to many military officials since then, in the US and UK, Taleban resistance was far stiffer than expected, and the mission had to pull out fast.

Fall of Kabul, November 13: In a row about whether the US could or would control the Northern Alliance capture of Kabul, President Bush declared on November 10 that the US supported its advance towards the city, but that fighters should not enter it. But they did, anyway.

Al-Qaeda's weapons of mass destruction: On November 6, Bush said it is "important to put Osama bin Laden out of business not only because of the September 11 attacks . . . but . . . because the US believes al-Qaeda is trying to acquire chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons."

Evidence was found of al-Qaeda's interest in these weapons, but signs only of the most rudimentary development.

Siege of Konduz, November 10-24: 20,000 Taleban fighters, including 6,000 Arabs and Pakistanis, were held at bay in the northern city of Konduz. Hundreds were reported killed when it finally fell to the Northern Alliance. During surrender talks, Rumsfeld said that he hoped they would not be allowed to go free. Explaining why all "prisoners" were in the end handed over to the Northern Alliance - vastly increasing the chance that they would be killed - he said that it was because US forces had no "detention facilities".

Massacre at Qala-i Janghi fort in Mazar-i Sharif, November 25: The Northern Alliance massacred up to 800 rioting Taleban prisoners in the fort. US bombs hit the Taleban inside the fort. A row erupted over whether the US encouraged the slaughter. The MoD confirmed British forces were "in vicinity" of fort after British accents were audible on tapes.

Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and US officials dismissed calls for an international inquiry, saying the Taleban had started the fight.

Rumsfeld said that an international stabilisation force was "not necessary". He was surprised that more people didn't understand that "when a war is going on . . . people leaving (a city) do things that one would hope they didn't and . . . other people in the city might do things that one would wish they didn't."

Death of CIA officer, November 28: The CIA issued an unusual written statement that Johnny "Mike" Spann, a clandestine officer, had been killed on Sunday in the fort battle. For three days, the Pentagon had denied casualties, despite a flood of rumours. The CIA said that it made the announcement only because "the word had pretty much leaked out", even though Tim Blair, a Pentagon spokesman, had said: "Either (Rumsfeld) or (Myers) said that we would report all casualties that we incurred in this campaign."

Escape of Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora: The Tora Bora complex of caves finally fell on December 11 after eight days of bombing. Many US military reports - particularly from critics of Commander Tommy Franks - now say bin Laden was there at the start of the campaign, although Rumsfeld denies there is good evidence.

Bin Laden tape delayed, December 10-14: White House stalls before finally releasing new tape of Osama bin Laden; Arab world disputes that he claims responsibility for September 11.

Mistaken bombing of civilians - I: The Pentagon said on December 21 that US planes attacked a convoy near Khost; local reports put dead at 10 to 65. US Central Command said: "We've checked all means possible and confirmed this was a military convoy." Hamid Karzai says they were tribal elders.

Capture of Kandahar: Although Kandahar fell on December 7, Mullah Omar appears to have escaped in the first week of January, despite US claims to control the area.

Mistaken bombing of civilians - II: On January 23, a pre-dawn raid by US special forces on the village of Hazar Qadam in the remote Oruzgan Province left 18 dead. It appears they were civilians. Karzai called it as "a mistake of sorts" resulting from "an unfortunate movement of people at the wrong time".

Guantanamo Bay: On January 28 Bush said of the detainees: "These are killers, they are terrorists." The day before, Rumsfeld called them "the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth". Three months on, not one has been charged, nor does any appear to have been senior within al-Qaeda.

Operation Anaconda: The biggest commitment of US forces from March 2 to March 12 let most al-Qaeda forces escape unscathed. The Pentagon still claims it was a success.

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