The Bush team is letting Pakistan drift toward chaos

Buying off Musharraf

International Herald Tribune
September 23, 2002
By Selig S. Harrison

The recent capture of the Qaeda leader Ramzi Binalshibh in a shoot-out in Karachi has dramatized the critical choices that face the United States in dealing with Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf.

As evidence mounts that Pakistan is now the global hub of Qaeda operations, Musharraf is raising his price for cooperation with Washington, demanding large-scale military aid, including F-16 fighter jets, on top of the bonanza of economic aid already showered on Islamabad since Sept. 11.

Equally important, he made clear during his U.S. visit last week that he plans to perpetuate his military regime indefinitely and expects Washington to look the other way when he rigs the Pakistani elections next month.

So far the Bush administration has allowed Musharraf to call the tune. The Pentagon has just approved $230 million in subsidized military sales to Pakistan and has opened a dialogue with Islamabad on its military needs in a newly reactivated Defense Consultative Committee.

At the same time, the White House has been craven in its tacit approval of Musharraf's steady assumption of dictatorial powers during recent months, climaxed by his promulgation of 29 constitutional amendments that allow him to dissolve an elected National Assembly at will and to make all important appointments to the armed forces, the judiciary and provincial governorships without legislative approval.

The Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has predicted "an inevitable political crisis, either before or after the elections," pointing to increasingly bitter opposition to the military regime from all political parties, outraged by election rules that bar most established political figures from running for office.

At best, Pakistan is likely to be engulfed in growing instability in the months ahead that will make it easier for Islamic extremists to operate. In the worst-case scenario, Musharraf's fellow generals will decide that he is more of a liability that an asset, opening the way for a series of military coups in which a hard-line Islamic extremist sympathizer such as General Mohammed Aziz, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could well come out on top.

As a top official of Inter-Services Intelligence, General Aziz helped organize the Harekat-ul-Mujahidin, which has spawned a profusion of Islamic militant groups, linked to Al Qaeda, that Pakistan has used to destabilize Kashmir.

It is not new for Pakistan to be ruled by a U.S.-supported military regime. But there is a basic difference between Musharraf and the three military autocrats who preceded him - a difference that explains why his position is shakier than past military regimes and why it is so risky for the United States to give him unconditional support.

Although Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia Ul-Haq were also generals who distrusted politicians, they recognized that the armed forces alone could not govern Pakistan. All of them shared power with the entrenched civil service that was bequeathed by the British Raj. It is the civil service that has given Pakistan cohesive and efficient administration despite periodic political turmoil. By contrast, Musharraf has elbowed aside the bureaucracy, installing 76 generals and 600 brigadiers and colonels in a variety of key civil service posts.

Significantly, military officers are now running most of the powerful government agencies that oversee the Pakistani economy. Among the dozens of such agencies under military control are the Karachi Port Authority, the National Shipping Corporation, the National Fertilizer Corporation, the Pakistani Steel Corporation, the Oil and Gas Development Corporation and the Minerals Development Corporation. Six university vice-chancellors are also military officers.

This grab for economic power is linked in the public mind with the fact that the armed forces run a sprawling industrial, commercial and real estate empire with assets and investments totaling at least $5 billion.

The nucleus of the military business empire is a network of four foundations that were initially set up to help retired servicemen but now manage money-making ventures headed by 18,000 serving and retired military officers. The operations of these foundations are not subject to legislative supervision.

In contrast to earlier years when the Pakistani armed forces were viewed as paragons of selfless dedication to the nation, suspicions of military corruption are spreading, fueled by the resentment of ousted civil servants.

As opposition to the armed forces grows, so does anti-American sentiment. To safeguard their long-term interest in a stable Pakistan, the United States and other aid donors should continue economic aid to Pakistan only on condition that fair elections are held, accompanied by a clear timetable for a gradual return to civilian rule.

This would not upset cooperation in combating Al Qaeda because the military regime desperately needs sustained foreign economic support to survive in the transition period ahead.

By the same token, it is not necessary to buy off Musharraf with military aid. The Bush administration should limit military cooperation with Pakistan to supplying spare parts for military equipment already supplied. New military hardware for Islamabad would not only add to the danger of a new war between India and Pakistan but would also embitter relations between India and the United States once again as it did throughout the cold war.

The writer, director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy in Washington, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

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