A perilous choice for the presidents

An alleged Al Qaeda leader's confession persuades Washington that it has conclusive evidence that the group has sunk roots in Southeast Asia with the help of an Indonesian-based group. But acting against Jemaah Islamiah could cause big problems.

Far Eastern Economic Review
September 27, 2002
By Barry Wain and John McBeth

The United States is convinced that it has enough evidence to prove that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization was using an Indonesian-based Islamic organization to set up a terrorist network in Southeast Asia. But persuading a reluctant President Megawati Sukarnoputri to crack down on the militant Jemaah Islamiah could create a host of domestic problems for her and generate a profound anti-American backlash in the world's most populous Muslim nation.

That seems to have begun already, with politicians and media ridiculing reports that a man called Omar al Faruq had confessed to being an Al Qaeda operative in Indonesia. The Americans clearly saw Omar's confession, which one U.S. official describes as "the big dump," as the proof they needed to convince others of Al Qaeda's influence in the region and of the need to take stepped-up action against it and its allies.

His arrest on June 5 must have seemed like a windfall for the frustrated Americans. Omar was tracked down by Indonesian intelligence agents after his phone number was found programmed into the cellphones of suspected Indonesian Islamic militant Agus Dwikarna, arrested in the Philippines in March, and of Al Qaeda operations chief Abu Zubaida, seized in Pakistan in April. Handed over to U.S. authorities and whisked out of the country, Omar held out against his interrogators for more than three months before cracking, U.S.officials say.

He apparently had a lot to say. Claiming to be Al Qaeda's senior representative in Southeast Asia, Omar allegedly told his U.S. Central Intelligence Agency interrogators that he had masterminded bombings in Indonesia with the help of Abu Bakar Bashir, the Indonesian Muslim cleric accused by the U.S. of being the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiah, which has tentacles across the region. Omar, believed to be an Iraqi, also said he was sent to attack large-scale U.S. targets throughout the region.

Apart from triggering a frantic terror alert that temporarily closed U.S. diplomatic facilities in several countries, Omar's disclosures were seen as adding substance to speculation about Al Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, revelations by Singapore after the arrest in August of a second batch of suspected Islamic militants--including 19 alleged Jemaah Islamiah members--appeared to shed more light on objectives, including creating a pan-Islamic state in the region.

"It's clearly not just a loose series of associations with home-grown fundamentalist groups," says Alan Dupont, director of the Australian National University's Asia-Pacific security programme. "It's a tighter network and more extensive than we appreciated before."

Omar's testimony also seems to provide confirmation of some of the common assumptions about the region that have been made since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, such as the progressive radicalization of a still largely moderate Islam. It contributes to "the complex interplay between corroboration and credibility," as one diplomat puts it, producing a more integrated picture of Al Qaeda's presence in Southeast Asia.

The new revelations also turn the heat up several more degrees on Indonesia's President Megawati, whose government regards separatism and social upheaval as more serious threats than international terrorism. And in regarding the war on terrorism as secondary to domestic security concerns, she is not alone in the region, with only Singapore in close agreement with the United States that terrorism amounts to a new Cold War.

But stepped-up pressure by the U.S. administration on Megawati to put Abu Bakar Bashir and his associates out of business, despite his denials that he is behind Jemaah Islamiah and in bed with Al Qaeda, is fraught with risk. If Megawati does crack down on the group, she risks alienating those who resent any U.S. interference and those who don't believe there is any terrorist threat to the country.

Media and politicians have heaped scorn on reports of Omar's alleged confession to the CIA. And Megawati faces opposition from her own vice-president, Hamzah Haz, whose Muslim-oriented United Development Party, among others, has opposed five different drafts of a new terrorism law.

The Americans are aware of the danger. U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce met yet again with moderate Muslim leaders on September 24 and urged them to acknowledge and confront the Al Qaeda presence in Indonesia.

"It's an Indonesian responsibility that will have an Indonesian solution," he told them. "It's not a solution that will be imposed on you by the United States." The Americans have delayed listing Jemaah Islamiah as a terrorist organization to give Megawati and her security forces more time to tackle the problem.

But there are some who believe the Americans may be rushing things. "There is a tendency now to join the dots and fill in the blanks--even without sufficient evidence--because we're worried about missing something," says a senior official in Washington.

While Omar's confession implicates Jemaah Islamiah, which is the only radical Islamic organization without an obvious local cause that has been uncovered in the search for international terrorists in Southeast Asia, he doesn't explain the group's origins or purpose. Rohan Gunaratna, a Sri Lankan terrorism expert, has described Jemaah Islamiah as an "associate group" of Al Qaeda, though their precise relationship remains unknown.

But it is Jemaah Islamiah's alleged connections with long-established and visible militant Islamic groups in neighbouring countries that worry diplomats and analysts tracing Al Qaeda's influence. For instance, Singapore alleges that the 21 people it arrested in August, including the 19 suspected Jemaah Islamiah members, had numerous cross-border contacts.

The Singapore authorities claim that Jemaah Islamiah considered the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines a "key ally," sent funds to the group--which is now in peace talks with Manila--and received combat training in return.

In 1999, Jemaah Islamiah initiated an alliance with other Islamic militant groups in the region to facilitate cooperation and share resources, including training, buying arms and conducting terrorist operations, Singapore said. The ultimate aim was to establish an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Mindanao, Singapore and Brunei.

While Western diplomats are convinced that Omar is a senior Al Qaeda cadre, at least one of his claims--about an attempt last year on Megawati's life--appears hardly credible and, in Indonesian eyes, therefore casts doubt on the rest of his story.

Omar began spilling the beans on September 9. That afternoon, U.S. diplomats received the first report that Al Qaeda had made plans, using Jemaah Islamiah operatives, to attack U.S. embassies in the region to mark the September 11 anniversary. In the case of the Jakarta embassy, Omar was going to launch an attack with truck bombs. (See Intelligence item on page 12.)

Omar named six non-Indonesians involved in the bomb plot, including German Arab Seyam Reda, who was picked up by Indonesian police at his $4,000-a-month luxury south Jakarta home on September 17. They found high-speed copiers, an internal camera system and photos of Omar giving weapons to Islamic militants in Indonesia's Central Kalimantan province, where he is alleged to have run a terrorist-training school.

But for those who fear that Al Qaeda has become deeply entrenched in Southeast Asia, some security analysts provide a more reassuring assessment of its performance. The group has an uneven record, the analysts say, showing a combination of sophistication and amateurishness that almost certainly means it lacks the ability to carry out its declared goals.

One example of missed opportunity: In the years that the latest Jemaah Islamiah detainees were operating in Singapore before their detection in August, they failed to attack any of the targets they reconnoitred. As for leaving numbers in cellphones, it's a breach of the basic rules of operational security.

Academic Dupont argues that nearly every government directly involved with Al Qaeda's penetration of Southeast Asia - except Indonesia - has a vested interest in exaggerating the situation. "It's clearly an important emerging problem for the region," he says, "but the tendency is still to overplay the threat."

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