Sending Turkish troops to Iraq ill-conceived

Turkish Daily News
October 15, 2003
By Ferruh Demirmen

Last week Turkish Parliament approved a government motion to dispatch thousands of Turkish troops to Iraq to beef up the U.S.-led coalition in that war-torn country. Ignoring widespread public opposition, the AK Party (Justice and Development Party)-dominated Parliament caved in to pressure from Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan to the give green light to the government. The motion was taken up in a closed session of the Parliament, shutting out the public from deliberations that took place. The deputies were evidently too embarrassed to reveal who said what, and who voted how. The voting was 358 for and 183 against the motion.

Except for the fact that the troop deployment would be limited to one year, crucial aspects of the troops decision, e.g., timing, number of troops, their geographic location, remain unresolved. A contingent of some 10,000 troops has been mentioned as a likely figure, which would make Turkey roughly as big a contributor to the coalition as the UK. Outside the U.S. and the UK, the largest contributor to the coalition at present is Poland, having a contingent of 2300 troops.

Public opinion and secrecy aside, there are several reasons why the troops decision is ill-conceived. First, there is no United Nations resolution to authorize Turkey or other nations to deploy troops in Iraq. Currently foreign involvement in Iraq is almost exclusively American - without backing from the UN. A UN resolution would be needed to give international legitimacy to stationing Turkish troops in Iraq. It is significant that President Ahmet Sezer has opposed the idea of sending troops to Iraq without a mandate from the UN.

Secondly, Iraq is a rather dangerous place to be in. The government has tried to sell the troops' mission as a peacekeeping job, but the fact is, there is no peace in Iraq. The country is an occupied land, a wasteland with broken institutions and grossly inadequate civil services. Chaos is widespread, and security is lacking. Loyalists of Saddam Hussein instigate or carry out daily violence in the country to protest the occupation. The Turkish troops will no doubt be seen as part of the occupying force by many Iraqis. That means their lives will be at risk. The most likely region for Turkish troops is, Sunni-populated, central Iraq, where pro-Saddam sentiments run high and where resistance to occupation is strong.

Under current conditions "peacekeeping" in Iraq is a palliative intended for public consumption. "Painful nation-rebuilding" would be a better term. A fitting description, considering deep ethnic and sectarian divisions within Iraqi society and the violent and tortuous history of the country after it became a British mandate in 1920. A country devastated by foreign occupation will have to be put together, and there are many roadblocks and imponderables on the way.

Third, the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council has unanimously opposed the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq. The opposition seems to be rooted in 400 years of Ottoman rule of Iraqi territory before World War I. Although Turkey has had no ulterior designs on Iraqi territory, including its oil, for the past 80 years, the Council's opinion is difficult to ignore. It will reinforce the perception among Iraqi people that the Turkish troops are in their territory for reasons unrelated to peacekeeping. That would not be a good development for Turkey. Why send troops somewhere where they are not welcome?

Of course, some would argue - as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul did - that the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq would give Turkey a voice in Iraq's political future. Such an expectation seems grossly inflated. Iraq's future political landscape will be shaped pretty much along the lines prescribed by the U.S., with a federated structure being the most likely scenario. The Bush administration has not shown any willingness to share with other nations - except on a limited basis - and it is unrealistic to assume that it would do so with Turkey.

It is worth noting that the U.S. wants other nations to contribute troops to the coalition not because these nations would have a significant say in Iraq's political future, but because the Bush administration wants to reduce American casualties in Iraq and bring the soldiers home as soon as possible. Alleviating the financial burden, where possible, is an additional objective. Contribution from other nations also helps the Bush loyalists to make the argument - badly needed on home front - that the Iraq engagement is international in character.

Likewise, the argument that the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq would strengthen Turkey's hand in fighting the PKK/KADEK terrorist group in northern Iraq, carries little weight. Turkey should reserve the right to fight terrorism whether or not it contributes to coalition forces in Iraq. Assertion of such right should not be conditioned on troops deploymen. In fact, negative public reaction in world opinion against troop deployment could make it more difficult for the Turkish military to make - as it has in the past - occasional "hot pursuits" into Iraqi territory to hunt down terrorists.

Admittedly, the Americans have pledged action - unspecified - to rein in the PKK/KADEK terrorists in northern Iraq. But how this pledge will translate into reality is uncertain. Considering the fact that the U.S. troops are already thinly stretched in Iraq, and that they are wary of new hostilities, it is unlikely that the pledge will translate into an armed campaign against the terrorists, especially in the relatively placid Kurdish territory where the terrorists take refuge. Turkey may end up with an effectively empty pledge in its hand.

These negatives aside, one deplorable aspect of the troops decision is the apparent linkage to an $8.5 billion U.S. loan to Turkey. The linkage has been denied by both the American and Turkish officials, but it takes a good deal of naivete or wishful thinking not to see the connection. While not making a direct reference to Turkish troops, the loan agreement requires Turkey to "cooperate" with the U.S. in Iraq. What would be a meaningful way for Turkey to "cooperate" other than contributing its troops? The agreement also stipulates that disbursement of the first tranche of the credit is subject to Pentagon's approval. The implication is too obvious to require further comment.

Additional evidence for the linkage comes from the timing of the loan. Currently the U.S. has a whopping budget deficit of more than $400 billion, and has been spending $4 billion a month on Iraq operation, and the Bush administration is seeking a new $87 billion spending authorization - a "shocker" for American taxpayers - from the Congress for continued Iraq engagement. Thus the U.S. is hardly in a generous mood to extend sizeable loans to other nations unless it sees a clearly identifiable benefit to do so.

The Bush administration's war critic Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, while drawing scorn from the White House, was not off the mark when he made the accusation last month that the administration was bribing or coercing other nations to entice them to be more cooperative on its Iraq policy. He had the U.S. loan to Turkey in mind when he made this assertion.

Whatever the diplomatic spin, it can be safely assumed that the U.S. loan is tied to Turkey's deployment of troops in Iraq. A quid pro quo involving Turkish troops has been attached to the loan. The impression that is left is not pretty. It is demeaning to Turkey's image, and it puts the government's troops decision all the more in an unfavorable light. Was the government so desperate for a new loan to ignore the offensive nexus? What made the Parliament go along with the government? The answer may explain why the deputies decided to hold a closed session on the troops motion.

Should Turkey ever contribute troops to the coalition in Iraq? The answer is "yes" if there is a UN resolution to this effect and if Iraqis welcome Turkish troops. Neither of these conditions exist today. There should not be a demeaning quid pro quo. Last, the government, instead of evading public scrutiny by having the Parliament hold a secret session on the subject, should convince the people of the necessity of getting involved in Iraq. This is what democracy requires, and this is what the AKP promised.

Note: Ferruh Demirmen is an occasional commentator on political and strategic issues in Turkey and its region.

 
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