In light of Islamist electoral victories, neoconservatives in Washington about face, seeing democracy in the Middle East as not such a good idea after all

Al-Ahram Weekly
24 November 2005
By Gamil Mattar

The wave of democratic reform in some countries of the Arab world has calmed, and, for the most part, been turned back. In fact, recent developments indicate that the reins of initiative within the region's states has likely returned to the hands of the ruling regimes which held steadfast -- I would not say they were victorious -- throughout their first tests in the battle of democracy. With their resoluteness and for other reasons addressed below, they may, as usual, succeed in freezing conditions by relying on the factor of time that has typically stood on their side, encouraging them to reject change and stick to waylaying in order to uphold stability.

It appears that the foreign powers that were for some time determined to goad the Arab region along the path to democracy have lost their zeal. President Bush, the most prominent and most zealous promoter of democracy, is still speaking of democracy in the Arab and Islamic worlds and yet his rhetoric has lost its fervor of persuasion as well as its insistence and focus. It's no secret that Condoleezza Rice has switched from the position of constantly criticising the state of democracy in the Middle East and stressing the necessity of reform to a position of praise for what has been accomplished despite the fact that what has been realised on the ground does not conform to what America and the currents calling for change in Arab states had demanded.

Perhaps more significantly, an important current among conservative trends in America has pulled back from its position on spreading democracy in the Arab world. Two prominent members of the American Enterprise Institute, an intellectual and ideological base for the ruling conservative right in Washington, say that after deep consideration they have arrived at the realisation that democracy in the Middle East may bring to power governments opposed to the United States and inimical towards Zionism. They say that they discovered the dilemma into which the missionary campaign for democracy had fallen when it faced the possibility of Hamas in Palestine, fundamentalist Sunnis, Baathists, and the armed resistance in Iraq, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and Jordan assuming rule of those countries.

Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum, one of the architects of the war on Iraq and the proselytising campaign for democracy in the Middle East, says: "America must slow down the democratic process ... to prevent an Islamic government reaching power in Arab states." In plain self-contradiction he adds that he continues to say, "Yes to democracy ... but not now, for democracy is a slow process ... and may take centuries to develop." In other words, the expectations of many Arab officials and observers have been met and the American proselytisers of democracy have regained their forthrightness and a view of the reality Arab governments have for so long tried to bring home to the administration of President Bush and his ideological cohorts.

Daniel Pipes counsels the American government to grant leaders in the Middle East an opportunity to prepare a "comfortable timetable" for the entrance of democracy "at their ease" to their countries. He adds frankly, "I personally prefer the dictators of today to Islamist dictators in the future." How this phrase resembles those so oft repeated these days by Arab intellectuals in this capital or that. I heard such statements and worse in a conference that brought together a significant number of political currents to discuss the dangers threatening Egypt and its unity and stability, ie sectarian strife. At the Cairo conference I heard something that falls in line with the opinion of a second American intellectual who participated in devising ideological and political justification of the war on Iraq, Reuel Gerecht, when he said, "The dictators of today, with their corruption, are a factor driving Muslims in large numbers toward preference for the Islamic alternative." Nor did the import pass me by of a statement made by a religious scholar who attended the conference when he said, "Political corruption is what produces large numbers of Muslims who prefer Islamic fundamentalism."

Among the manifestations of resolve shown by the Arab regimes in their confrontation with the reform campaign, and in convincing some that this steadfastness was in fact victory, was the position some Arab states took explicitly or implicitly at the Bahrain conference convened under the title "Future Forum." The position was a shock to many civil society organisations and the political opposition that was expecting from the conference support for the advancement of democratic reform in their countries, not through actual assistance obtained from the forum but from moral support the movement would have gained and which extremists in governments of the region would have lost. Many of those returning from the conference whom I met said that the position at the end of the conference embodied a setback the reform movement in most Arab countries was going through along with the simultaneous awakening of most of the extremist powers in the region's governments and dominant currents.

As the first stage of the Egyptian legislative elections came to a close, some of the leaders of civil society and the opposition decided that it was a revealing experience that had come at the right time. It revealed the truth that reform has not advanced and will not do so in the form wished for or at the speed desired. It also revealed that reform has brought no accomplishments of note for the two most important minorities in Egyptian society -- women and Copts.

Feminist leaders did not hide their anger at the National Council that had been established under the umbrella of reform and with the goal of building the capacities of Egyptian women and advancing their participation in political activity. Numerous symposia and conferences were held for this purpose, training courses were conducted for hundreds of women in the Delta countryside and Upper Egypt, and exorbitant funds were spent to this end. Yet when the time came to test its real accomplishments on the ground, and before an opportunity that does not come every day, women were addressed by a situation closer to ridicule. It became clear that the ruling party either did not find new female faces to bring forth in the first stage of the elections or, as some of its mouthpieces in the media stressed, it was not ready to risk losing seats that women were nominated for. On the other hand, women from the opposition who participated in the first stage of the elections were but a handful and all of them lost.

As for the other significant minority -- Egypt's Copts -- it did not accept excuses given to justify the dominant party's shortcomings in nominating Copts and helping them to win. Among these excuses was the same one given about the nomination of women. This neglect augmented other causes that stirred up sectarian tension despite warnings from the voices of reason who hoped the ruling elite, and the political classes in general, would avoid everything that might throw oil onto a fire that had not yet died down.

It's no secret to observers of the campaign for political reform in the Arab world that the ruling Arab regimes have passed the stage of danger and returned to employing methods of rule it was thought they had relinquished under pressure from home and abroad. I believe that intentions are set on returning conditions to those extant before the "frenzy" of reform, as one of political leader prefers to put it, no matter the cost of this return. I also believe that this intention will grow more persistent as the factors that encouraged the resolve of Arab regimes maintain their effectiveness. These factors are fourfold.

The first is the extreme weakness of President Bush's administration, especially as it has come at the right time -- like a present to the opponents of reform and a blessing none of them had expected. President Bush is obliged, to face his sinking popularity, to turn the focus of his speeches and foreign policies from the spread of democracy to domestic issues. I believe that this has reached the capitals of the Arab region, implying that reform will not be an American priority during the next three years.

Second is the devastating failure of the "new" Iraq as a model of democracy in the Middle East. Even the literature of the democratic and liberal movements in all Arab states eschew praising the political process in Iraq, beginning with the drafting of the constitution and the referendum on it and ending with the current preparations for the upcoming legislative elections. Iraq, with its chaos, widespread violence and threat of fragmentation, has become the model of an attempt at political reform via foreign intervention or at a faster speed than the ruling regime in all Arab states considers appropriate for their history, geography, religious circumstances, illiteracy rates, previous experiences, and innumerable other particular characteristics.

The third factor is the crisis overhanging Syria that has added a new dimension to the extreme state of disturbance in the region. The prevailing view among Arab ruling elites and their circles is that if the current situation in Iraq is to continue, the United States will be driven, to one degree of rashness or another, to open up another front to lighten the pressures upon it in Iraq. It might even resort to placing pressure on Arab states to play a military role in Iraq, after having agreed to political engagement, particularly as Arab states must admit that American pressures for reform have lightened to a great extent and have relieved them of a heavy and despicable burden. Both Arab analysis and mutual consultation taking place between Arab capitals have not overlooked the correlation of developments in Lebanon to those in Iraq via the developments in Syria and the international position on them. It's no secret that there is real fear in some Arab capitals of the consequences of American-French partnership in control of Lebanon, the supple limb of the East's body.

The fourth and final factor is that most of the Arab states have not wasted the opportunity of the victory of Ahmedinejad in the Iranian presidential elections to assert their final position that democracy poses a threat to moderate policies and warm relations with the West. Comments were made in Israel rejecting the principle of Natan Sharansky, who President Bush said was an inspiration to him and his campaign to spread democracy in the Middle East, and warning against democracy bringing the likes of Ahmedinejad to all Arab states.

It is clear that a large part of the crisis into which the campaign for reform has fallen was brought about by the mistakes, immaturity and petty squabbles of political opposition currents. It is also clear that the alternative to the status quo is not yet complete, and that in most Arab counties it has not even reached the stage of formation. Here we must admit that insistence on not providing opportunities to establish an alternative to a regime, policy, or individuals has borne fruit across the Arab world.

The writer is director of The Arab centre for Development and Futuristic Studies.

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