Can the Afghan peace hold? The Royal Marines are coming home from Afghanistan and there is a new President in Kabul. Is the war really over, asks Dan Plesch, in the latest of his monthly Observer Worldview commentaries.
The Observer
June 23, 2002
By Dan PleschThe success of the Loya Jirga has infused more democracy into Afghanistan than it has seen in decades, and far more than exists amongst its Central Asian neighbours. But will the peace hold? Aid and the prospect of aid may persuade war lords that there best interests will not be served by renewed fighting. But their influence may be threatened by the return of a million refugees which will have a large impact on the political economy of Kabul and other cities.
How will the warlords react to attempts to stamp out the opium trade. So far the US focus has been to cut off the supply routs and not much attempt has been made to stop the latest crop. But the US and other Western publics may start asking why they are still suffering from Afghan heroin when we have an army on the ground there.
But it would be a great mistake to think that because British soldiers are on their way home the war is over. The General commanding the US 18th Airborne Corps which is running operation Enduring Freedom has stated that US troops will remain for at least another year.
There is a rosy scenario in which political cohesion in the country is gradually established. In this scenario the East of the country is kept quite as pressure from Pakistan on side of the border and from US forces on the other prevents any serious renewal of fighting. A low and politically acceptable level of violence continues.
The new interim government continues to be heavily influenced by the Northern Alliance at the expence of the Pashtun. This will only be reinforced by Turkey's new role commanding the stabilisation force in Kabul. Turkey has sought an increasing role in Central Asia since the collapse of communism. No one in the region will see its role as that of a referee.
While the rest of the international community picks up the task of civilian nation builidng, the US's continuing role will be to support a new Afghan Army. This training and equipment programme is beginning already. This force is also likely to be drawn from troops of the Northern Alliance and to not be acceptable to the Pashtun.
With these uncertainties in mind we be aware that there are almost daily reports of rocket attacks and firefights in Eastern Afghanistan. The US base at Khost comes under frequent, if so far ineffective, rocket attack. US troops returning from a futile mission to track down the rocketeers described the experience as 'just like Vietnam.'
In recent weeks there have also been a number of reports of allied or civilian Afghans being killed by US forces. Again, in the long run this may amount to nothing much. On the other hand a strongly Northern government in Kabul and the heavy presence of the US in the South East may lay the ground for a renewed civil war where the Pashtun again fight of foreign invaders. The Al Qaeda and remaining Taleban, with time on their side, may be waiting to play a role in any such war.
It would be rash to assume either that Al Qaeda and the Taliban feel they have been defeated or that they do not still relish the chance to fight the Americans. The view from the terrorists side of the mountain may be far more optimistic than we are led to believe by our governments. Outside Afghanistan there seems to be a successful bomb attack almost every week, whether of French defence workers, a US consulate or a synagogue in Tunis.
Within Afghanistan itself Al Qaeda may well be relishing a victory over US and allied special forces in the battle of Sha I Kot near Gardez. This was the US operation Anaconda that filled our TV screens in early March. It was promoted as an assault that would surround and crush Al Qaeda in the mountains. The US acknowledged that they had underestimated the enemy strength. By the end of the battle most press reports concluded that Al Qaeda fighters mostly escaped US attacks and that they suffered dozens rather than than hundreds of casualties. The operation was not the 'unqualified success' claimed by General Franks.
The reality of Anaconda was far worse than has been portrayed so far. Al Qaeda may well consider it a victory. The US attempted to defeat them in high mountains using a combination of locally recruited Afghans and US helicopter borne troops. One Pentagon official was quoted afterwards as saying; "they knew we were coming."
As they scrambled from their helicopters in companies of a hundred, the US and allied forces came under intense fire and were pinned down for several days at numerous locations up and down the Sha I Kot valley.
Most US attack helicopters were badly damaged, eight men were killed and over sixty injured. For two days the airspace was so dangerous the US could not send in more helicopters to rescue their troops.
The failure at Anaconda led the US to call in the British marines, but since then there have been no large assaults. US troops are however continuing to carry out large sweeps across the mountains of the Hindu Kush, but whether these are effective in locating an enemy who for now may just be biding him time is most uncertain.
Like the Soviets before them, the US may find that its first year in Afghanistan will be its best. A key issue will be whether the Pashtun factions remain relatively content or whether a new war between them and the government in Kabul erupts. In this event the US may find that that the small scale rocket attacks they have experienced so far were merely intended to probe and expose US defensive tactics for a more serious assault in the future.
· Dan Plesch is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and author of Sheriff and Outlaws in the Global Village.