Many hurdles will delay U.S. attack on Iraq Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting)
10 July 2002U.S. President George W. Bush vowed July 8 to use "all tools" at his disposal to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Speaking at a surprise news conference, Bush said the world would be a safer place once Saddam was overthrown and that he personally is engaged in "all aspects" of planning to achieve that goal.
The speech was not the first time Bush had made it clear that his administration is committed to regime change in Iraq. Of the many options available to the White House, only large-scale military action will guarantee the United States an active hand in Iraq once Saddam is gone. However, technical limitations will push back the date of an attack until winter at the absolute earliest, and a host of political hurdles could delay a campaign indefinitely.
U.S. strategic planners see two specific reasons to depose Saddam. First, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs threaten the balance of power in the Middle East. Officials in Washington also fear that those weapons someday could find their way into the hands of al Qaeda. This argument is based on logic and potentiality rather than evidence, but the consequences of such a development would be so terrible that the argument must be given credence.
The second reason involves oil. Iraq has huge reserves of crude, and gaining control over those resources would greatly enhance U.S. energy security -- and give Washington considerable leverage over other oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The governments of both countries absolutely depend on oil revenues to maintain domestic stability, and both use their reserves as leverage when negotiating with the United States and the rest of the world. For example, Saudi Arabia's oil reserves are a big reason that U.S. military forces are chasing al Qaeda in western Pakistan and not in western Saudi Arabia.
U.S. influence over Iraqi oil reserves would dramatically decrease Riyadh's leverage with Washington. And, in a pinch, the United States could threaten to increase Iraqi outputs and bankrupt the Saudi and Iranian economies.
But how to get rid of the current regime in Baghdad? The most hands-off option would be some sort of covert action to remove Saddam -- possibly by assassinating him, capturing him or forcing him to flee the country. However, this also is the most difficult option and the one least likely to succeed. There also is no guarantee that whatever group that replaced Saddam would be any better or easier for Washington to control.
Sparking an internal coup is equally unlikely. For one thing, it is an extremely difficult thing to do: STRATFOR counts at least four unsuccessful coup plots since the end of the Gulf War. Iraq is a police state in many respects, and Saddam has an extensive internal security apparatus at his disposal, comprising multiple agencies that watch each other as well as monitor potential unrest. He also manipulates the tribal rivalries that permeate Iraq, playing factions against each other until it is unclear who is on which side.
Coups and covert action carry with them the same problem: The United States would have relatively little control over the successor government. In this particular case, any Iraqi military officer with the fortitude to take on Saddam would not likely jump eagerly into a role as a U.S. proxy. A new military regime may even find it useful to continue Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.
The only way to ensure the collapse of the current regime and the establishment of a suitable replacement is to put U.S. boots on the ground in Iraq. The question is, how many boots? The "Afghan model" of warfare certainly offers an appealing answer. Using Special Operations forces to link up with local militants under U.S. air cover would require relatively few U.S. troops, without a months- long buildup. (..) An assessment earlier this year by a former National Security Council member estimated a that a total force of 200,000 to 300,000 troops would be necessary -- a number that was confirmed by later leaks from the Pentagon. Troops likely would be stationed in Kuwait and Turkey, with a limited number in Jordan. (..)
The Bush administration's problem is that any campaign against Iraq depends upon a host of other factors. These technical and political problems likely will set back any potential attack until nearly 2004. On the technical side, the U.S. military has not recovered fully from the initial battle in Afghanistan. Military forces, especially aircraft carriers, were thrown into battle on the fly last fall, much to the detriment of training and maintenance schedules. Three of the 12 U.S. aircraft carriers are currently at sea, three are in training cycles, and the rest are undergoing repairs in port. Training and repairs for several more carriers are scheduled for completion by late autumn, giving the Pentagon at least five carriers for an attack.
Also, the U.S. military still may be short of critical weapons. Defense officials told the Wall Street Journal in May that it would take approximately six months to bring the stock of Hellfire anti-tank missiles up to levels necessary to attack Iraq. The same is true for the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs -- which use a global positioning system guidance mechanism -- that proved so useful in Afghanistan.
Even if the Pentagon's arsenal was bulging, U.S. troops and supplies still would have to be moved into place, and most estimates say the buildup would take at least two months. There was some evidence earlier this year that the United States has been "cheating" -- quietly moving men and materiel into the theater -- but even at the most optimistic, Washington apparently would need at least one month for buildup.
Even more difficult than logistics are the numerous political issues to be solved. For instance, the war in Afghanistan must be kept at no more than a low simmer in order for a campaign against Iraq to proceed. Washington also must ensure that tensions between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India do not re-ignite after elections in Kashmir this October and that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not spill over into the rest of the Middle East, as it threatened to do this year.
The White House also must feel comfortable that Syria and Iran will not intervene on Baghdad's behalf. Neither is any great friend of Iraq, but both Damascus and Tehran are extremely nervous about the prospect of a U.S. proxy state, with its hand on the oil taps, emerging on their borders.
Likewise, the Bush administration must counter Saudi Arabia's diplomatic efforts to block an attack on Baghdad. Riyadh is concerned both about its status in the oil market and the fundamentalist backlash that a U.S. attack could trigger at home. That's why the Saudi government has spent the last six months trying to force Washington to focus on the conflict in Israel.
If that weren't enough, the government in Turkey -- one of Washington's key allies -- is now caught in a domestic political maelstrom: The coalition government is slowly collapsing, and new elections may be in the works.
Meanwhile, much of the rest of the industrialized world -- including the European Union, Russia and China -- are none too keen on Washington's plans. It is doubtful that they will actively oppose the United States with anything more than rhetoric, but Washington would no doubt like to have their silence, if not their support.
Last but by no means least, the United States must have a successor regime ready to take over in Baghdad. Assembling such a regime is no easy task, given the squabbling factions that make up the Iraqi opposition. They mirror the Iraqi population itself, which is split between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds -- all of which are further subdivided into competing clans and tribes.