menu
spacer
 
| Ander Nieuws week 50 / nieuwe oorlog 2008 |
 
 
 
Canada's last war?
The Afghan mission has taught our politicians a lesson

 
The Globe and Mail
November 27, 2008
Douglas Bland
 
Will Afghanistan be Canada's last war?
 
The human costs of the mission have been high - nearly 100 dead, more than 400 wounded and many other soldiers scarred for life. Spouses, children and families left to struggle with difficult situations for years to come. Canadian society, as well, has been affected by this. Although citizens "support the troops," salute the dead and assist the families, they see these patriotic acts as separate from the mission that most now do not support.
 
The material costs of the war are also significant. More than $18-billion will have been spent by the time troops leave in 2011, in particular equipping the formerly depleted Canadian Forces for the mission. Many billions more will be needed to continue rebuilding after the mission ends.
 
For Canadian political leaders, wars are also costly things over which they have little control. The uncertainties of conflicts and the demands of allies steal politicians' agenda-setting advantage, deplete scarce resources intended for other policies, and subject prime ministers to a continual barrage of unanswerable questions tossed in their faces by the opposition and media. Problematic commitments, as in Afghanistan, have no upside. They breed confusion in government - every day is a domestic crisis.
 
Before the Afghan mission began in earnest, military commanders and political leaders had at best a vague idea of the cost in dollars, people, materiel, and political capital the commitment would entail. Now, after more than five years of experience, officers and government officials have empirical evidence that will allow them to estimate closely the costs of any future mission that would replicate the circumstances of the Afghan mission. This model allows senior military officers to describe confidently to political masters the requirements and costs of the type of missions we might face in the future.
 
These missions have several common characteristics. They occur in underdeveloped regions where supporting infrastructure is weak, if available at all. Conflicts often involve some type of "war among the people," where the enemy is "the other" and no local leader has enough power to win the struggle or impose a lasting peace on the warring factions. There tends to be no obvious "exit strategy" at the time intervening forces are deployed. And the intervening forces often confront military, paramilitary, private military, criminal, religious and spontaneously organized opponents in changing combinations all committed more or less to different objectives. "Winning the war" may be the political aim for such interventions, but this aim has no practical definition and is instead invented as the intervention unfolds. The logistical costs of the mission are high and unpredictable. Governments work in alliances of nations that can be expected to agree only to fight together separately. The war will last for years, or until contributing countries simply become frustrated with the effort and set individual, arbitrary exit dates for their units.
 
There are many such "replica" missions out there. Consider, for example, the entire Horn of Africa, including Darfur; or Afghanistan and Pakistan; or the Congo and other parts of Central Africa. The Balkan feuds are not settled. Serious conflicts on the Afghan model are under way or developing in Zimbabwe, Haiti and Central America.
 
In light of the Afghanistan experience, to which of these replica missions would any Canadian government commit Canada and the Canadian Forces? Every one of these possible missions carries significant domestic political liability for any government brave or foolish enough to make a commitment. Canadian politicians understand this fact implicitly.
 
The answer, therefore, to the question, "What replica mission in the future?" is, "No replica mission at all." No government will again commit Canada to any mission even suggestive of the situation previous governments committed themselves to in Afghanistan. These types of missions will be avoided not merely because of their inherent costs and complications, but because there is no domestic political advantage in committing Canada to them. Better to mimic the Europeans in these affairs - volunteer to stand with the posse, but not up front beside the American sheriff.
 
Every Canadian political leader today - and those campaigning to lead this country tomorrow - has learned the fundamental political lesson from our sacrifices in Afghanistan. Canada's war in Afghanistan is Canada's last war.
 
Douglas Bland is Chair of the Defence Studies Program at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University
 
© Copyright 2008 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc.
 
Original link
 

 
 
| Ander Nieuws week 50 / nieuwe oorlog 2008 |