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Global Viewpoint
07 July 2009
Alastair Crooke
The troubles that have followed the Iranian presidential elections have been generally misread by the Western press and policymakers. What we have witnessed was not a frustrated East European-style "color revolution"; nor was presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi's movement an uprising of liberal Westernized sympathizers against the principles of the Iranian Revolution -- albeit there were surely some who are hostile to the Revolution amongst his supporters.
Rather, what we have been witnessing is a power struggle -- between factions of the "Old Guard" clergy who all initially assumed power in 1979 -- that erupted into public view in the recent election campaign. As that dispute is settled over the coming months, we can expect big changes in the top ranks of the power elite. But the Revolution is not about to implode.
The essential dispute centers around prominent clerics, mainly former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who have sought to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ability to pursue his populist attack on their privileged position. They also have sought to diminish the political weight of the Revolutionary Guard, which they see as increasingly at odds with their interests.
This faction of the elite is deeply threatened by President Ahmadinejad's assault on their personal wealth, and by his claims that it was these senior clerics' pursuit of their own narrow self-interest, at the expense of ordinary people, that is the root cause of Iran's economic woes.
It was this group of powerful clerics that stood behind the Mousawi challenge to Ahmadinejad. It was ex-President Khatami who was designated by this faction to propose to Mousawi that he stand for election; it was Khatami who initially offered the opposition leader the umbrella of their powerful political standing at the center of Iran's elite.
Thanks in no small part to this blessing, Mousawi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, could credibly campaign on the platform of their revolutionary credentials: They were "children of the Revolution"; they both participated in it, were "shaped by it" and they remained disciples of Imam Khomeini. Their quarrel, they made clear, was with President Ahmadinejad and his conduct of government.
Mousavi's casting of his mission as one of restoring the Revolution to its original ideals was not only an internal message; it was also replayed widely in the Arab media. But the West seemed to be hearing and hoping for something else: that he was challenging the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and would seek to flout the institutions of the Revolution. In other words, he was seeking to ignite a "color revolution" like those in Eastern Europe to change the system.
The extent to which Mousavi intended to send this signal and benefit by leveraging Western support is unclear. But that perception has opened Mousavi and his prominent backers to the risk of severe repercussions internally in the wake of the post-election turmoil.
Indeed, it is on the basis of such allegations that Hossein Shariatmadari, the influential editor of the conservative Kayhan newspaper, has called for both Mousavi and ex-President Khatami to face trial.
Paradoxically, the Western understanding that Ahmadinejad is a tool of the clerical leadership who stands with the repressive Revolutionary Guard and Basij (the popular militia) against reform could not be more wrong. It was Ahmadinejad who campaigned against the wealth and self-interest of some of the clerical elite. Mousavi was more closely allied to those interests.
The West should also understand that there are clerics in both Qum and Tehran, some of whom despise Ahmadinejad himself, who nonetheless share his view that some senior clerics have failed to actualize the spirit of the Revolution in their lifestyles. The Revolutionary Guard, too, is probably much more radical in wanting genuine reform than is generally understood.
What we are dealing with here is a complex struggle over the future course of the Revolution. It is a struggle for the future vision of Iran that is overlaid by deep personality differences that in turn arouse deep passions.
For now, it is clear that a powerful determination has emerged in the wake of the election to exorcise the Rafsanjani-Khatami circles from the establishment, fuelled by a growing popular anger as the evidence of their external links to the West is being carefully examined. Rafsanjani himself, who is well aware of the dangers of becoming isolated and excluded from the circles of power, is now walking a tight rope.
On July 4, he was quoted as saying that the election crisis reflected a power struggle at the "highest levels of the system." In a carefully worded statement, he warned that any "awakened consciousness" could not be ignored, but also spoke of the need to safeguard revolutionary institutions. Though one step removed, his Kargozaran party has gone further, calling the election results "unacceptable" as a result of "massive election fraud."
The impact of these recent events on Iranian foreign policy is likely to be the opposite of what Western commentators have foreseen. It is not likely that the Revolutionary Guard, which is under the control of the Supreme Leader, will be paralyzed, but rather the reverse.
In many respects, the regional situation works to Iran's advantage: Iraq remains at a crucial juncture; Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to be on the slide; Turkey has distanced itself from the European stance on the elections; and China has never before expressed such staunch solidarity with the Iranian regime. Neither Syria nor Hezbollah nor Hamas are poised to disengage with Iran. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem questioned the legitimacy of the street protests in Tehran and warned: "Anyone betting on the fall of the Iranian regime will be a loser. The Islamic Revolution is a reality, deeply rooted in Iran, and the international community must live with that."
As for Iran's relations with the West, President Ahmadinejad left hardly anything to interpretation when he stated at the end of June that, "Without doubt, Iran's new government will have a more decisive and firmer approach toward the West. This time the Iranian nation's reply will be harsh and more decisive."
Similarly, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made it clear that Iran will not easily forget the disparagement and condescension displayed toward the Islamic Republic in recent weeks. From the perspective of many in Iran, a "red line" was crossed as Western leaders seemed -- from their perspective -- to be trying to fan the dissent of Mousavi's supporters into an instrument to de-legitimize the Revolution and execute "soft regime change."
Despite such hopes in the West, however, an end to the Revolution is not in sight. More likely is a counter-reaction that will lead to the isolation of Mousavi and his associates as popular forces allied with Ahmadinejad seek to inject new stimulus into the Revolution by cleansing it of the corrupted elements of its Old Guard.
Alastair Crooke, the legendary former British intelligence (MI6) agent, was adviser to EU High Representative Javier Solana on Middle East issues from 1997-2003 as well as the Mitchell Commission looking into the causes of the Palestinian intifada. He has been involved in negotiating with Hamas and other Islamist movements, including the ending to the Church of the Nativity siege in Bethlehem in 2002. Currently, Crooke heads the Conflicts Forum in Beirut. His recent book is "Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution."
(c) 2009 Global Viewpoint Network; (TM) Tribune Media Services, Inc.
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